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Threshold Requirements for the FBI Under Exemption 7 of the 
Freedom of Information Act 
INTRODUCTION 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was signed into law on 
July 4, 1966.I The FOIA gives "any person" the statutory right of 
access to government information.2 Upon signing the new law, Presi-
dent Johnson wrote: "No one should be able to pull the curtains of 
secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the 
public interest."3 The general purpose of FOIA is "to establish a gen-
eral philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is ex-
empted under clearly delineated statutory language."4 This policy is 
furthered by placing the burden of proof on the agency seeking to pre-
vent disclosure. 5 
By the early seventies, critics suggested "that the act ha[d] become 
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966). The FOIA has been amended substantively twice in its history -
in 1974, see notes 6-16 infra and accompanying text & Part I.B infra, and 1986, see notes 24-26 
infra and accompanying text & Part I.C infra. For an exhaustive listing of both published and 
unpublished cases and law review articles dealing with the FOIA, see UNITED STATES DEPT. OP 
JUSTICE, FREEDOM OP INFORMATION CASE LIST (1987). 
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982). 
3. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OP THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CoNG., 2D SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE 
BOO!{ (Comm. Print 1974), 1 [hereinafter 1974 SOURCE BOOK]. 
4. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra 
note 3, at 38; S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BooK, 
supra note 3, at 93. 
The current Exemption 7, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986), provides: 
[The Freedom of Information Act] does not apply to matters that are -
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent 
that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to 
a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the 
identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or 
any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case 
of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of 
a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence 
investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques 
and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guide-
lines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosures could reasonably 
be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endan-
ger the life or physical safety of any individual. 
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965), reprinted i11 
1974 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 43. The withholding of information under one of the 
statutory exemptions is merely permissive. An agency may, if it so chooses and is not forbidden 
by other law, disclose such information. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted 
in HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS & SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 
}ST SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502) SOURCE 
BOO!{ 158 (J. Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter 1975 SOURCE BOOK]; 120 CONG. REC. 17,016 
(1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted i11 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra, at 286-87. 
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a 'freedom from information' law, and that the curtains of secrecy still 
remain[ed] tightly drawn around the business of our government."6 
Congress in 1974 amended the FOIA over President Ford's veto and 
attempted to close some of the "loopholes" in the original FOIA.7 
One "loophole" closed by the 1974 amendment was Exemption 7.8 
This exemption, as amended in 1974,9 exempts from disclosure "inves-
tigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, or informa-
tion which if written would be contained in such records," if the 
disclosure of the information would create one of the harms specified 
by the exemption. 10 Exemption 7 (1974 version) permitted an agency 
to withhold information which, if disclosed, would endanger pending 
investigations11 or judicial proceedings, 12 personal privacy, 13 confiden-
tial sources, 14 investigatory techniques, 15 or the life or physical safety 
6. 1974 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added). See generally Katz, The Games 
Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TExAs L. REv. 
1261 (1970); Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1 (1970). 
7. 120 CONG. REC. 6804 (1974) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 5, at 236 ("The aim of the [1974 amendment to FOIA] ... is to correct the 
dangerous inadequacies [of the original FOIA] ... as well as ... frustrating personal experiences 
of many [House members] ... in their dealings with Federal agencies."); 120 CONG. REc. 6807 
(1974) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 245 
("[O]ur subcommittee has discovered many instances of failure to respond to the dictates of this 
act and many efforts to frustrate them by delaying release of public material. The bill before us 
now is intended to remedy [these] problems .... "); 120 CONG. REc. 6812 (1974) (statement of 
Rep. Moss), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 258 ("[l]t is the intent ... that the 
Federal courts be free to employ whatever means they find necessary to discharge their responsi-
bilities [under the FOIA] .... I ask for your unanimous support for this legislation which is 
intended to close such loopholes and make the·right to know more meaningful to the American 
people."); 120 CONG. REc. 17,016 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1975 
SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 287 (The 1974 amendments were designed to close loopholes in 
the 1966 FOIA.). 
8. See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text. 
The original Exemption 7 in the 1966 FOIA provided that the Freedom of Information Act 
"does not apply to matters that are .•. investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes 
except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) 
(1966). 
9. Exemption 7 was further amended in 1986. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). See 
note 4 supra (text of current Exemption 7); note 10 infra (text of 1974 Exemption 7). 
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982). The 1974 amended Exemption 7 provided: 
[The Freedom of Information Act] does not apply to matters that are ... investigatory 
records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that production of 
such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a 
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a 
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investi-
gation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, con-
fidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative 
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement 
personnel. 
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1982). 
12. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7)(B) (1982). 
13. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1982). 
14. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982). 
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of law enforcement agents.16 
The Supreme Court in FBI v. Abramson 17 determined that infor-
mation could be withheld under Exemption 7 (1974 version) only if a 
two-pronged test could be satisfied by the agency seeking to prevent 
disclosure. "First, a requested document must be shown to have been 
an investigatory record 'compiled for law enforcement purposes.' If 
so, the agency must demonstrate that release of the material would 
have one of the six results [i.e., harms] specified in the Act."18 
The federal courts of appeals disagree over the application of the 
first prong of the Abramson test when applying Exemption 7 to law 
enforcement agencies such as the FBI, 19 but they generally agree on 
the application of the second prong of the Abramson test, which ad-
dresses the issue of specific harms resulting from release of the 
material. 20 
The First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have held that Exemption 7 
applies to all investigative files of the FBI regardless of whether they 
were compiled for law enforcement purposes (hereinafter called the 
"per se rule").21 Under the per se rule, the first prong of the Abramson 
test is automatically satisfied with respect to FBI records; the court 
must only determine whether their disclosure would cause one of the 
six harms specified in the statute. Accordingly, if the court finds that 
one of the specified harms will occur, the information can be withheld 
whether or not it was compiled for law enforcement purposes. In ef-
fect, the per se rule reads the statutory language "compiled for law 
enforcement purposes" out of Exemption 7 for FBI information. 
The District of Columbia Circuit requires that the FBI show that 
the information was actually "compiled for law enforcement pur-
15. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7)(E) (1982). 
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (1982). The current Exemption 7(F), supra note 4, allows infor-
mation to be withheld if the release would endanger the life or safety of any individual. 
17. 456 U.S. 615 (1982). See also Note, Administrative Law - Freedom of Information Act 
- Law Enforcement Exemption May Prevent Disclosure of Records Not Compiled for Law En· 
forcement Purposes, 57 TuL. L. REv. 1564 (1983). 
18. 456 U.S. at 622. 
19. Other courts considering the first prong of the Abramson test have refused to choose 
between the two alternative interpretations. See Doherty v. United States Dept. of Justice, 775 
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985); Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ga. 1984). The Second Cir-
cuit's refusal to adopt a specific rule in 1985 is inconsistent with its adoption of the per se rule 
one year earlier. See Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1984). 
20. See generally J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFOR· 
MATION AND PRIVACY ACTS §§ 1.10(1]-[6] (1987); 2 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE ch. 17 (1986); C. MARWICK, YOUR RIGHT TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 98· 
110 (1985). See also note 76 infra. 
21. See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 
1984); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980). The First Circuit has reaffirmed its use of 
the per se rule in light of the 1986 amendment to Exemption 7, see notes 24-26 infra and accom-
panying text, in Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.1, 475 (1st Cir. 1987). 
Several district courts have also applied the per se rule. See Abrams v. FBI, 511 F. Supp. 758 
(N.D. Ill. 1981); LaRouche v. Kelley, 522 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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poses" before Exemption 7 applies (hereinafter called the "threshold 
rule"). 22 Under this threshold rule each prong of the Abramson test 
must be satisfied before the information can be withheld. In theory, if 
the court determines that the information was not "compiled for law 
enforcement purposes," it would not even reach the second prong of 
the test, thereby foregoing consideration of whether disclosure would 
cause any of the six specified harms. The standard required for the 
threshold test has been expressed in varying language, all of which is 
generally deferential towards the FBI.23 
In 1986, Congress again amended Exemption 7 of the FOIA.24 
Although Congress made minor language modifications to the first 
prong, it remains virtually unchanged so far as the threshold require-
ment is concerned: disclosure may still be denied for "records or in-
formation compiled for law enforcement purposes."25 Congress did 
not offer any advice on the proper standard for the first prong of the 
Abramson test.26 Therefore, the conflict among the federal courts of 
appeals over the first prong remains.21 
It is likely that most FBI investigations are for proper "law en-
forcement purposes" and are carried out using proper means.28 There 
are, however, numerous examples of potentially improper law enforce-
ment activities. The most common might include investigations moti-
vated by political advantage or revenge, investigations directed at 
silencing or harassing critics, investigations employing illegal entry, 
illegal wiretapping, or other illegal activities, and general domestic 
22. Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). The District of Columbia Circuit has reaffirmed its use of the threshold rule in light of the 
1986 amendments to Exemption 7, see notes 24-26 infra and accompanying text, in Keys v. 
United States Dept. of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
Several district courts have also applied the threshold rule. See Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F. 
Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Silets v. FBI, 591 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1984); King v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 586 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1983); Founding Church of Scientology v. 
Levi, 579 F. Supp. 1060 (D.D.C. 1982), ajfd. sub nom. Founding Church of Scientology v. Smith, 
721 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Demetracopoulos v. FBI, 510 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1981); Duna-
way v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Malizia v. United States Dept. of Justice, 
519 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
23. See notes 79-84 infra and accompanying text. 
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). The actual amendment was contained in Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 to 3207-49 (1986). See 
note 4 supra (text of current Exemption 7). 
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). The requirement for specified harms remains, 
although the specific language has been changed. See note 4 supra. 
26. See notes 96-102 infra and accompanying text. 
27. See Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.1, 475 (1st Cir. 1987) (reaffirm-
ing per se rule); Keys v. United States Dept. of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(reaffirming threshold rule). 
28. This hypothesis is probably more true today than before such legislation as the FOIA 
because, in part, of the increased tendency to disclose publicly improper investigations. But it is 
also likely that if attempts to decrease the amount of law enforcement disclosure are successful, 
the number of improper investigations may well increase. See also note 111 infra. 
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surveillance. 29 
This Note examines Exemption 7 of the FOIA as it relates to 
FBP0 information and seeks to determine the appropriate rule for the 
first prong of the Abramson test. Part I of this Note examines Exemp-
tion 7 in the 1966, 1974, and 1986 FOIAs, the judicial opinions inter-
preting this exemption, and the legislative histories of the 1966, 1974, 
and 1986 FOIAs as they relate to Exemption 7. Part II compares the 
per se and threshold tests in view of their practical effects and con-
cludes that neither test is clearly superior. Part III proposes adoption 
of a per se rule with significant procedural changes. This modified per 
se rule provides that all "records or information" of the FBI are pre-
sumed "compiled for law enforcement purposes" under Exemption 7. 
However, when the requestor can show a "reasonable likelihood under 
the circumstances" that the investigation was for political or other im-
proper purposes or was carried out by improper means, the court must 
examine the requested documents in camera31 to insure, if possible, 
that the political or other improper purpose or the use of improper 
means is disclosed. 
I. THE 1966, 1974, AND 1986 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTS 
A. The 1966 Freedom of Information Act 
The general purpose of the FOIA is "to establish a general philoso-
phy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under 
clearly delineated statutory language .... "32 As Representative Laird 
pointed out, the FOIA "helps to shred the paper curtain of bureau-
29. Note, FOIA Exemption 7 and Broader Disclosure of Unlawful FBI Investigations, 65 
MINN. L. REV. 1139, 1149-53 (1981). See, e.g., J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION 33, 55, 135 (1976); F. 
MANKIEWICZ, U.S. V. RICHARD NIXON: THE FINAL CRISIS 92 (1975); R. NIXON, THE 
MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 388-89, 472-76, 872 (1978); D. RATHER & G. GATES, THE PAL-
ACE GUARD 293 (1974); B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 34, 51-53 (1976). 
See also, Shenon, F.B.L Papers Show Wide Surveillance of Reagan Critics, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 
1988, at 1, col. 3 (FBI involved in extensive surveillance over a five-year period of "hundreds of 
American citizens and groups opposed to the Reagan Administration policies in Central 
America"; FBI asserts that investigations were proper.). 
30. This Note is generally limited to the application of Exemption 7 to the FBI. Agencies 
that have mixed purposes (i.e., both law enforcement and administrative functions) must gener-
ally show, in order to employ Exemption 7, that the information requested was actually "com-
piled for law enforcement purposes" and that one of the specified harms would occur or would 
reasonably be expected to occur. Thus, such "mixed-purpose" agencies must meet the threshold 
standard. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. United States Dept. of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 
(9th Cir. 1979); Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dept. of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 80 (D.C. Cir. 
1974); Birch v. United States Postal Serv., 803 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also J. 
FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 20, at 1-114. 
31. In camera inspection of documents under the FOIA is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1982). Such inspections are currently at the discretion of the court. See, e.g., 
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973) ("Plainly, in some situations, in camera inspection will be 
necessary and appropriate. But it need not be automatic."). 
32. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra 
note 3, at 38. 
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cracy that covers up public mismanagement with public misinforma-
tion, and secret sins with secret silence."33 The FOIA is, therefore, 
intended not only to give the public access to government information 
but also to allow the public to see how the government and public 
servants operate, including their mistakes and errors of judgment. 34 
The original 1966 FOIA required the disclosure of government in-
formation unless the government agency could show that the re-
quested information was exempt under at least one of the nine FOIA 
statutory exemptions.35 Under the 1966 Act, Exemption 7 allowed for 
nondisclosure of "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement 
purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an 
agency."36 The interpretation of the threshold requirement of Exemp-
tion 7 was at issue in only a few cases. These cases can be divided into 
two groups. In the first, the courts generally applied a two-part 
threshold test to determine if the information was "compiled for law 
enforcement purposes" and, if so, examined the information to deter-
mine if disclosure would harm37 the government. Only if a specific 
harm to the government could be found was the file exempted from 
disclosure. 38 
In the second group of cases, some of which were specifically over-
ruled39 by the 1974 amendment of FOIA, the courts generally applied 
33. 112 CONG. REc. 13,648 (1966) (statement of Rep. Laird), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 3, at 58. 
34. See 120 CONG. REc. 17,038 (1974) (statement of Sen. Weicker), reprinted in 1974 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 344-46 ("None of the abuses that we have seen come out of [the 
Watergate and related tragedies] ... would have happened if more people, more eyes, more ears, 
had been on the scene."); 112 CONG. REc. 13,650-51 (1966) (editorial from Memphis Commer-
cial Appeal, June 16, 1966, quoted by Rep. Grider), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 
3, at 64 ("The new [FOIA] law would protect necessary secrecy but the ways of the transgressor 
against the public interest would be much harder."). See also note 93 infra. 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1966). The exemptions of the FOIA are to be narrowly construed 
with ambiguities to be resolved in favor of disclosure. Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 
489 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 
(1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 
1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. 
FfC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Stem v. Richardson, 
367 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (D.D.C. 1973); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469 
(D.D.C. 1972). Cf. LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971). 
36. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7) (1966). 
37. This second prong of the test was not specifically included in the 1966 version of Exemp-
tion 7. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1966). Both the 1974 and 1986 versions of Exemption 7 in-
cluded specific harms for which nondisclosure was appropriate. See notes 4 & 10 supra. 
38. Stem v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973). See also Weisberg v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane) (Bazelon, C.J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). 
39. 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 349. The 1974 amendment of Exemption 7 was 
specifically intended to overrule the following cases: Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 
489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Aspin v. Depart-
ment of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Center for Natl. Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues 
v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Although the legislative history does not mention 
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a one-part threshold test to determine if the file was "compiled for law 
enforcement purposes"; if the file was "compiled for law enforcement 
purposes," it was exempt from disclosure without further inquiry.40 
Thus under the 1966 FOIA, much government information may have 
been kept secret even when disclosure would not harm the government 
or its ability to function. It was in such an environment that the effort 
to amend Exemption 7 arose in 1974. 
B. The 1974 Freedom of Information Act 
The 1974 amendments to the FOIA were designed to correct vari-
ous problems associated with the 1966 Act.41 Most of these amend-
ments were directed towards procedural reform rather than 
substantive changes.42 There were, however, some substantive 
changes made to the FOIA, including the adoption of an amended 
Exemption 7, which allows nondisclosure of "investigatory records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes" only if disclosure would re-
sult in specific, statutory harms.43 
The 1974 amendment to Exemption 7 specifically overruled44 four 
District of Columbia Circuit cases45 that applied Exemption 7 in a so-
called "wooden[] and mechanical[]" manner.46 During the Senate 
floor debate, Senator Hart of Michigan offered the amendment to Ex-
emption 7,47 emphasizing that "material cannot be and ought not be 
exempt merely because it can be categorized as an investigatory file 
compiled for law enforcement purposes."48 Referring to the four Dis-
Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dept. of Agric., 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974), it seems 
clear that it was also overruled by the 1974 amendment. The court in Rural Housing indicates 
that its standard follows directly from the Weisberg and Aspin decisions. 498 F.2d at 79. 
40. In Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974), the plaintiff sought to obtain FBI files concerning the assassina· 
tion of President Kennedy. The court found that the FBl's files were "investigatory in nature" 
and "compiled for law enforcement purposes," and then added "[w]hen that much shall have 
been established, ... such files are exempt from compelled disclosure." 489 F.2d at 1198. Sena· 
tor Edward Kennedy later characterized this application of the standard as "wooden[] and 
mechanical[]" and "in direct contravention of congressional intent." 120 CONG. REC. 17,034 
(1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 335. 
41. See note 7 supra. 
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 226-34 (1978). 
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982). See note 10 supra (text of 1974 version of Exemption 7). 
44. 120 CONG. REc. 17,039-40 (1974) (statements of Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Hart), reprinted 
in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 349. 
45. See note 39 supra. 
46. See note 40 supra. 
47. 120 CONG. REC. 17,033 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE 
BooK, supra note 5, at 332-33. 
48. 120 CONG. REC. 17,033 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 5, at 333. 
The Hart amendment also clarified congressional intent. Substituting the word "records" for 
"files" suggests that courts should consider the nature and content of the files, rather than the 
"label" attached to them by the agency, in applying the Exemption. 120 CONG. REC. 17,034 
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trict of Columbia Circuit cases, 49 Senator Hart indicated that the 
court's interpretation of Exemption 7 erected a "stone wall" against 
public access to any material in an investigative file.so Significantly, 
the specific harms for which nondisclosure would be appropriate are 
included in the statutory language of the 1974 amended Exemption 7. 
Thus, the court in applying Exemption 7 is "require[d] ... to 'loo[k] to 
the reasons' for allowing withholding of investigatory files before mak-
ing [its] decisions."s1 
The 1974 amendment made other substantive changes in the FOIA 
that are useful in considering Exemption 7. A new sentence, explicitly 
allowing for the disclosure of a "segregable portion" of documents, 
was added to the FOIA section containing the nine statutory exemp-
tions. This addition allows documents to be released after subject mat-
ter falling within the nine statutory exemptions is deleted. s2 
Furthermore, the use of in camera inspection of documents by the ex-
amining court was explicitly made available for Exemption 1, which 
relates to national security-related information.s3 Before 1973, Con-
gress intended that in camera inspection be available for all documents 
sought under the FOIA regardless of the exemption claimed by the 
agency. s4 But in 1973 the Supreme Court held, in EPA v. Mink, ss that 
in camera inspection was not permissible for documents falling within 
Exemption i.s6 The 1974 amendment specifically overruled Mink and 
(1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 336 ("[I]t 
is Congress[ional] intention for courts to look behind classification markings ... [or] investiga-
tion mark[s] stamped on a file folder."). See also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 
at 229-30; Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 800, 807 
(1967). 
49. See note 39 supra. 
50. 120 CONG. REc. 17,033 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 5, at 332. 
51. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 230 (1978). See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7) (1982); 120 CONG. REc. 17,034 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1975 
SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 334 ("Until a year ago the courts looked to the reasons for the 
seventh exemption before allowing the withholding of documents. That approach is in keeping 
with the intent of Congress and . . . we wish to reinstall it as the basis for access to 
information."). 
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982); S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974), reprinted in 
1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 183. 
53. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(l) (1982). 
54. 120 CoNG. REc. 17,019 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 5, at 294; S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1974), reprinted in 1975 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 180-81. 
55. 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973) (request was for documents classified as "secret" or "top-secret,'' 
relating to an underground nuclear test; court held that Exemption 1 did not allow in camera 
inspection of the classified documents to "sift out ... 'non-secret components' "). 
Amended Exemption 1 now allows the court to inquire into whether the documents were 
properly classified. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1982). 
56. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 12 (1974), reprinted in 1975 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 225-26, 229; 120 CONG. REC. 6816 (1974) (statement of Rep. 
Drinin), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 270; 120 CONG. REC. 17,017 (1974) 
(statement of Sen. K;ennedy), reprinted in 1915 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 287-88. 
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confirmed congressional approval of the general use of in camera in-
spection where appropriate. 57 Both of these changes support the prop-
osition that the basic congressional intent concerning the FOIA is to 
ensure that the emphasis is on disclosure. 
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in FBI v. Abramson 
adopted a two-pronged test for the 1974 Exemption 7: a requested 
document must "have been an investigatory record 'compiled for law 
enforcement purposes,'" and the release of the material must result in 
one of the six specified harms. 58 However, the issue in Abramson was 
whether FBI information originally compiled for "law enforcement 
purposes" loses its Exemption 7 status when it is later reproduced or 
summarized in a new document prepared for political purposes.59 The 
issue of interest to this Note, the proper standard for the first prong of 
the Abramson test when the FBI file is not originally compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, was not before the Court in that case. 
1. Judicial Interpretation of the First Prong of the Abramson Test 
- The Per Se Rule 
The lower courts have differed in their application of the first 
prong of the Abramson test. Some courts have followed the per se rule 
in applying Exemption 7 to FBI files, holding that all "investigatory 
records" of the FBI, whether actually compiled for "law enforcement 
purposes" or not, are assumed to be "compiled for law enforcement 
purposes" in applying Exemption 7 to FBI files. 60 The first prong of 
the Abramson test therefore is not even considered under the per se 
rule; the court's only inquiry relates to whether disclosure would re-
sult in one of the six specified harms. At least when dealing with gov-
ernment agencies such as the FBI, courts applying the per se rule 
generally believe that the phrase "law enforcement purpose" in Ex-
emption 7 is "a description of the type of agency [to which] the exemp-
tion is aimed. "61 
In Irons v. Bell, 62 the leading per se rule case, the plaintiff (a stu-
dent activist, civil rights organizer, and draft resister during the 1960s) 
57. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra 
note 5, at 169 (The amendment was to "make clear the congressional intent - implied but not 
expressed in the original FOIA - as to the availability of in camera examination in all FOIA 
cases."). 
58. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982). 
59. The Supreme Court held that such information "continues to meet the threshold require-
ments" of being "compiled for law enforcement purposes." 456 U.S. at 632. 
60. This standard was first proposed under the 1974 version of Exemption 7. Courts apply-
ing the per se rule under the current exemption would likely hold that all "records or infom1a· 
tion" of the FBI, whether actually "compiled for law enforcement purposes" or not, are to be 
considered "compiled for law enforcement purposes" in applying Exemption 7 to FBI informa· 
tion. See Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.1, 475 (1st Cir. 1987). 
61. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1979). See also note 30 supra. 
62. 596 F.2d 468. 
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sued to obtain FBI documents relating to himself. 63 The district court 
ruled that the documents represented "routine monitoring of various 
activities ... [and were] unfocused domestic monitoring for purposes 
deemed generally prophylactic and were not generated 'for law en-
forcement purposes' within the meaning of [Exemption 7]"64 and, 
therefore, were not covered by Exemption 7.65 The First Circuit re-
versed, noting that the failure of the FBI "to establish such a [law 
enforcement] purpose was not a germane factor."66 The court of ap-
peals suggested that the _documents were compiled without "even a 
colorable claim to law enforcement purpose"67 but concluded that the 
lack of law enforcement purpose did not make Exemption 7 inapplica-
ble. The court remanded the case to determine if disclosure "would 
tend to reveal the identity of a confidential source,"68 and strongly 
suggested in camera inspection because "[ w ]here available facts tend 
to show the existence of the very overreaching [by the FBI that] Con-
gress intended to expose by amending Exemption 7 [in 1974], a court 
should use special caution to insure that the limited exemptions from 
exposure are not used to defeat Congressional purpose."69 
Courts have articulated four policy arguments supporting the per 
se rule. First, the FBI would be seriously harmed if information, fit-
ting within one of the six specified criteria or harms, was disclosed 
because the information was compiled for purposes other than law en-
forcement. For example, in Irons v. Bell the court pointed out that 
disclosure of an informer's identity, which normally would be exempt 
under Exemption 7, would be an " 'unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy' ... [and] would harm innocent individuals who had no way 
to test the legality of an FBI investigation. "7° Furthermore, such dis-
closures "would cost ... society the cooperation of those [informers] 
who give the FBI information under an express [or implied] assurance 
of confidentiality."71 Second, these courts assert, generally without 
supporting empirical data, that the unlawful purposes of the FBI in 
such cases will be made public whether or not the actual, detailed in-
formation is disclosed.72 Third, the FOIA should not "define and pro-
63. 596 F.2d at 469. The FBI actually released most of the requested documents prior to the 
suit; however, everything except the plaintiff's name was blacked out. 596 F.2d at 470. 
64. 596 F.2d at 470. 
65. 596 F.2d at 469. 
66. 596 F.2d at 471. 
67. 596 F.2d at 472 ("Those documents lacking even a colorable claim to law enforcement 
purpose present us with a difficult and novel issue."). 
68. 596 F.2d at 476. 
69. 596 F.2d at 476. This approach is similar to the modified per se rule proposed in Part III 
infra. 
70. 596 F.2d at 474. 
71. 596 F.2d at 474. 
72. This argument is difficult to either support or refute since it is impossible to determine 
just how many instances where the unlawful purpose or activity occurs but is not made public. 
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vide sanctions" for improper FBI activities. Rather, congressional 
action should provide the necessary sanctions. 73 Finally, it would be 
difficult to define workable standards to distinguish between a "colora-
bly justifiable investigation" and a bogus investigation.74 
2. Judicial Interpretation of the First Prong of the Abramson Test 
- The Threshold Rule 
Under the threshold rule of Exemption 7, the FBI must first show 
that the "investigatory records" were "compiled for law enforcement 
purposes. "75 If the FBI can meet this threshold requirement and can 
then show that one of the six specific harms would occur or "could 
reasonably be expected"76 to occur, the information is exempt from 
disclosure under the FOIA. If, however, the FBI cannot meet this 
threshold requirement, the presence of one of the six specific statutory 
harms is, in theory, immaterial and the information must be disclosed 
(unless it can properly be exempted under one of the other FOIA ex-
emptions77). In applying this threshold rule, courts look to the pur-
pose of the investigation and not to the methods of the investigation. 
Thus if the investigation was for a proper "law enforcement purpose," 
the fact that illegal methods were employed is of no significance in 
applying the threshold requirement of Exemption 7.78 
Society is only aware of those cases that are made public. The court in Irons v. Bell notes that the 
"questionable character of FBI practices has been made public through the disclosures already 
made." 596 F.2d at 474. Although the "questionable character of the FBI practices" was dis-
closed in Irons v. Bell, there is no assurance that the per se rule, as currently implemented, would 
routinely expose such illegal or questionable activities. The requirement of in camera inspection 
in cases where the plaintiff could show a "reasonable likelihood in view of the circumstances" of 
the investigation being for political or other improper purposes or employing improper means 
would substantially increase the probability of the questionable character being disclosed. See 
text at notes 126-30 infra. 
73. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d at 474 n.13. 
74. 596 F.2d at 474. 
75. This standard was first proposed under the 1974 version of Exemption 7. Courts apply-
ing the threshold rule under the current exemption would require that the FBI first show that the 
"records or information" were "compiled for law enforcement purposes." See Keys v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). The addition of the "could reasonably be ex-
pected" language in the specific harms tests for several of the subsections of Exemption 7 may 
not represent a significant change in the standard for each specific harm. See 132 CONG. REC, 
Sl4299-300 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (the second of two letters labeled "Exhibit I" from R. 
Ehlke, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, analyzing the substitution of "could 
reasonably be expected to" for "would" in several subsections of Exemption 7); J. FRANKLIN & 
R. BOUCHARD, supra note 20, at 1-117; Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The 1986 amendment to FOIA, 
which substituted 'could reasonably be expected to' for 'would' in Exemption 7(C), relieves the 
agency of the burden of proving to a certainty that release will lead to an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy, but does not otherwise alter the test."). See also note 85 infra. 
77. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(l)-(6), (8), (9) (1982). 
78. Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See text at note 149 infra for 
treatment of both purpose and methods of the investigation under the new, proposed standard 
for the threshold requirement. 
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Numerous statements of the standard used in the threshold rule 
have been presented. In general, they are very deferential to the 
FBI. 79 For example, in Pratt v. Webster the standard required that the 
FBI's investigatory activities be "related to the enforcement of federal 
laws or to the maintenance of national security"80 and that this rela-
tionship be "based on information sufficient to support at least 'a col-
orable claim' of its rationality."81 The standard used in Lamont v. 
Department of Justice required only a "good faith belief that the sub-
ject may violate or has violated federal law."82 A "sufficient connec-
tion between the conduct of the investigation and legitimate concerns 
for maintaining national security" was required to meet the threshold 
rule in Ramo v. Department of the Navy. 83 Not only do these cases 
show that the threshold rule, as currently applied, is deferential to the 
FBI, but also that it is in fact difficult to set out standards for distin-
guishing between proper and improper investigatory purposes. 84 
C. The 1986 Freedom of Information Act 
Congress recently complicated this debate by further amending the 
FOIA, including Exemption 7, in 1986. As amended, Exemption 7 
now provides that an agency can withhold "records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes" if one of six listed harms 
would occur or "could reasonably be expected" to occur. 85 These and 
other changes in the 1986 FOIA are generally rather minor.86 Most 
79. The legislative histories of both the 1966 Act and the 1974 amendments tend to support 
this deferential approach. See note 90 infra. At least one court has employed a less deferential 
standard. In Stern v. FBI, where the FBI was investigating its own employees, the investigation 
was required to focus "directly on specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular identi-
fied officials, acts which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanction." 737 F.2d 84, 89 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dept. of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 81 
(D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
80. 673 F.2d at 420. 
81. 673 F.2d at 421. 
82. 475 F. Supp. 761, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
83. 487 F. Supp. 127, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Other courts have also employed deferential 
standards for the first prong. Only "a minimal showing that the activity which generated the 
documents was related to the agency's function" was required in Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. 
Supp 1059, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1981). And, the law enforcement agency had to "demonstrate at 
least 'a colorable claim of a rational nexus' between activities being investigated and violations of 
federal laws" in Malizia v. United States Dept. of Justice, 519 F. Supp. 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
The standard was satisfied in all of the cases cited in notes 80-83 supra. 
84. See note 74 supra and accompanying text. 
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). See note 4 supra (complete text of the current 
Exemption 7). In the current Exemption 7 only subsections 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F) contain 
the "could reasonably be expected to [occur]" language; subsections 7(B) and 7(E) retain the 
"would [occur]" language from the 1974 version. See also J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra 
note 20, at §§ 1.10-1.10[6]; note 76 supra. 
86. The six specific harms included in the current Exemption 7 include the following: inter-
ference with an enforcement proceeding; deprivation of the right to a fair trial; "unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy"; disclosure of "the identity of a confidential source"; disclosure of 
"techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations"; and endangerment of "the life 
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significantly, the 1986 amendment to Exemption 7 does not appear to 
have changed the two-pronged Abramson test. 87 
D. The Legislative History 
Although the legislative histories of the 1966 Act and the 1974 
amendment are extensive, neither specifically discusses the threshold 
requirement of Exemption 7. And the legislative history of the 1986 
amendment88 specifically indicates that the latest amendment was not 
intended to change the two-pronged test under Abramson, although it 
does not indicate which test is actually appropriate for the first 
prong. 89 There are, however, some general principles and guidelines 
evident in the histories that aid the analysis of the threshold 
requirement. 
While Congress was concerned about disclosure of sensitive FBI 
information, it nonetheless intended the maximum possible disclosure 
of nonsensitive FBI documents. The legislative histories of the 1966 
Act and, especially, the 1974 and 1986 amendments suggest that FBI 
records should receive special consideration under Exemption 7 be-
cause of the nature of the information and the FBl's legitimate law 
enforcement role. Congress recognized that at least some government 
operations required secrecy; and the FBI was given as an example of 
an agency that required some level of secret operation.90 This defer-
or physical safety of any individual." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). The changes in the 
specific harms listed in Exemption 7 do not affect the analysis presented in this Note. 
The 1986 amendment also changed "investigatory records" to "records or information" in 
the threshold language of Exemption 7. Compare Exemption 7 (1974 version), supra note 10, 
with Exemption 7 (1986 version), supra note 4; see notes 99-102 infra and accompanying text. 
The 1986 amendment also made several additions that directly impact law enforcement agencies 
such as the FBI. These changes effectively allow the FBI to indicate that no record exists where 
the acknowledgment of the record's existence "could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(l) (Supp. IV 1986). See generally J. FRANKLIN & 
R. BOUCHARD, supra note 20, at §§ 1.10-1.10[6]; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of 
Information Act - 1986, 1987 DUKE L.J. 521, 524-29. 
There were also changes made to the fee and fee waiver structure of the FOIA in the 1986 
amendments. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). See also J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, 
supra note 20, at § 1.13; Note, supra, at 529-34. 
87. See notes 96-102 infra and accompanying text. 
88. There were no Senate or House Reports issued with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986), which contained the 1986 amendment to Exemption 7. 
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5393. But Senator Leahy indicated on the Senate floor 
during passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act that 
[t]he language of these amendments [to Exemption 7] is identical to that proposed in section 
10 of S[enate Bill] 774 .... The meaning and intended effect of the amendments was care-
fully explained in the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S[enate Bill] 774: Senate 
Report 98-221. This report sets out the legislative history which should be consulted to 
determine the scope of the section we are adopting in this bill. 
132 CONG. REC. Sl4,296 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
89. See note 102 infra and accompanying text. 
90. In discussing the 1966 FOIA, it was noted in at least two Senate reports that, although 
the FOIA reflects "a broad philosophy of 'freedom of information,' " the Act "is also necessary 
for the very operation of our Government to allow it to keep confidential certain material, such 
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ence to FBI records could be accomplished under either the per se 
rule, with its complete deference to the FBI on the first prong of the 
Abramson test,91 or the threshold rule, with its deferential standards.92 
But not all FBI activities were to be kept secret. Congress also wished 
to expose overreaching and illegal activities of the FBI while at the 
same time preserving the effectiveness of the FBI in carrying out its 
legitimate law enforcement role. At the time of the 1974 amendment 
to Exemption 7, Congress was clearly aware of, and concerned about, 
Watergate and related activities.93 Furthermore, Congress believed 
that the amended Exemption 7 would at least help prevent such occur-
rences. 94 As a general principle, Congress intended that the exemp-
as the investigatory files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 38; S. REP. No. 1219, 88th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 93. During debate in 
the House it was also noted that the 1966 FOIA "prevents the disclosure ... of 'sensitive' 
Government information such as FBI files .... " 112 CONG. REc. 13,659 (1966) (statement of 
Rep. Gallagher), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 82. 
In discussing the 1974 Hart amendment to Exemption 7, see note 48 supra, a general concern 
was apparent for the FBI and its legitimate law enforcement role. Senator Weicker noted that 
the amended Exemption 7 did not throw "the FBI open to the mob ... [as the amendment] is 
very restrictive and specific." 120 CONG. REc. 17,039 (1974) (statement of Sen. Weicker), re-
printed in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 348. Senator Kennedy indicated that the 
amended Exemption 7 was "specific about safeguarding the legitimate investigations that would 
be conducted by the Federal agencies and also the investigative files of the FBI." 120 CONG. 
REC. 17,039 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, 
at 349. Senator Hart, the sponsor of the amended Exemption 7, noted that it "was carefully 
drawn to preserve every [conceivable] reason the [FBI] might have for resisting disclosure of 
material in an investigative file . . . . [M]y amendment more than adequately safeguards against 
any problem which might be raised for the [FBI)." 120 CONG. REc. 17,040 (1974) (statement of 
Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 351. 
The 1986 FOIA amendment also spoke to congressional concern for the FBI. See note 102 
infra and accompanying text. 
See also Binion v. United States Dept. ofJustice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1983); Pratt v. 
Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 417-19, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474-75 (1st Cir. 
1979); Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F. Supp. 336, 342-43 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Ramo v. Department of the 
Navy, 487 F. Supp. 127, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
91. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text. 
92. See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text. 
93. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 17,016 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1975 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 285 ("We have seen too much secrecy in the past few years: ... 
secret campaign contributions, secret domestic intelligence operations, ... secret White House 
spying operations •... "); 120 CONG. REC. 17,038 (1974) (statement of Sen. Weicker), reprinted 
in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 344 (An effective FOIA might have prevented "many of 
the abuses which we place under the heading of Watergate .... "); 120 CONG. REC. 34,168 
(1974) (statement of Rep. Thompson), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 393-94 
(The 1974 FOIA is "the first major step forward in helping to restore the confidence of the 
American people in the institutions of government by purging the body politic of the secrecy 
excesses which marked the sordid Watergate coverup during the Nixon administration."); 120 
CONG. REC. 36,867 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra 
note 5, at 440 ("[N]ot even the FBI should be placed beyond ... the freedom of information law. 
Watergate has shown us that unreviewability and unaccountability in Government agencies 
breeds [sic] irresponsibility of Government officials."). 
94. See generally note 34supra; S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964), reprinted in 
1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 93 (One of the purposes of the FOIA was to prevent 
information from being withheld "only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities."); 
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tions be narrowly construed in order to encourage disclosure.95 
In 1986 Congress further amended Exemption 7,96 but it did not 
clarify which test courts should apply to determine the appropriate 
balance between disclosure and nondisclosure. The primary purpose 
of this amendment was to "fine-tune"97 Exemption 7 to address con-
cerns that "the confidentiality of informants and sensitive law enforce-
ment investigations is jeopardized by FOIA disclosures."98 The 1986 
amended Exemption 7 does contain new language for the threshold 
requirement - "records or information" has replaced the "investiga-
tory records" language of the 1974 amendment;99 but the language 
associated with the threshold rule remains essentially unchanged, 100 so 
that any "records or information" withheld under Exemption 7 must 
still have been "compiled for law enforcement purposes."101 Not only 
120 CONG. REc. -17,038 (1974) (statement of Sen. Weicker), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE Bom:, 
supra note 5, at 344 (An effective FOIA, as amended in 1974, might have prevented "many of the 
abuses which we place under the heading of Watergate" by bringing such activities to the atten-
tion of Congress and the American public at an earlier date.); 120 CONG. REC. 17,038 (1974) 
(statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 346 ("(T]here is an 
obligation and a duty and a right of a government to survive. But survival for a society such as 
ours hinges very importantly on the access that a citizen can have to the performance of those he 
has hired."); 120 CONG. REc. 17,039 (1974) (statement of Sen. Weicker), reprinted in 1975 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 347-48 (The 1974 amendment of Exemption 7 was designed, in 
part, to "deal ... with the lawless elements within the Federal Bureau of Investigation •••• "). 
See also note 93 suprd. 
95. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra 
note 3, at 38; S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BooK, 
supra note 3, at 93; S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 5, at 158. See, e.g., Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1980); 
Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Diamond v. 
FBI, 532 F. Supp. 216, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd., 707 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1004 (1984). 
96. See note 24 supra. 
97. S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983). Senate Report No. 221, printed in 1983, 
became the legislative history for the 1986 amendment by incorporation by reference. See note 
88 supra. 
98. S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983). The stated purpose of the nmendment 
was "to modify the scope of the exemption for law enforcement records •.. and clarify congres-
sional intent with respect to the agency's burden in demonstrating the probability of harm from 
disclosure." 132 CONG. REC. Sl4,296 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
99. This change in the threshold language was intended to "resolve any doubt that law en-
forcement manuals and other non-investigatory materials can be withheld under (b)(7) [i.e., Ex-
emption 7] if they were compiled for law enforcement purposes and their disclosure would result 
in one of the six recognized harms to law enforcement interests set forth in the subparagraphs of 
the exemption." S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983) (emphasis added). Assistant 
Attorney General Rose noted, in testimony concerning Senate Bill 774, that the change in the 
threshold language "would expand the categories of documents eligible for protection under Ex-
emption 7 to include certain types of background information, law enforcement manuals, proce-
dures and guidelines." Freedom of Information Reform Act, 1983: Hearings on S. 774 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 
(1984) (prepared statement of Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General). 
100. Compare the threshold language in the 1974 Exemption 7, note JO supra, with the lan-
guage in the 1986 version, note 4 supra. 
IOI. The amended language in the threshold section of Exemption 7 merely broadens the 
materials (from "investigatory records" to the more general "records and information") to which 
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did Congress leave the relevant language essentially intact, but it ex-
plicitly avoided clarifying which rule (threshold or per se) is appropri-
ate for Exemption 7 under the first prong of the Abramson test. 102 
Significantly, therefore, the legislative history associated with the 1966 
FOIA and its subsequent amendments does not favor either the per se 
or the threshold rule. 
II. COMPARISON OF THE PER SE AND THRESHOLD RULES 
A. The Threshold Rule 
The threshold rule as currently employed may lead to absurd re-
sults clearly not intended by a rational Congress. For example, under 
the threshold rule, if a "law enforcement purpose" is not found then, 
in theory, the inquiry is over and the information must be disclosed 
even if one of the six specified harms will actually occur upon disclo-
sure. 103 This would still be the case if the non-law enforcement pur-
pose could be exposed without disclosing the specific information 
leading to one of the six specific harms of Exemption 7. 104 For exam-
ple, under Exemption 7(D), an informer who wishes to remain anony-
mous cannot reasonably be expected, when deciding whether to give 
information to the FBI, to determine if the FBI investigation is for 
Exemption 7 might apply. This change was "intended to ensure that sensitive law enforcement 
information is protected under Exemption 7 regardless of the particular format or record in 
which the record is maintained." S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983). 
102. Senate Report No. 221 states: 
The Committee amendment [of Exemption 7], however, does not affect the threshold ques-
tion of whether "records or information" withheld under (b)(7) [Exemption 7] were "com-
piled for law enforcement purposes." This standard would still have to be satisfied in order 
to claim the protection of the (b)(7) exemption. See, e.g., FBI v. Abramson .... 
S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983) (emphasis added). 
Congressional concern for law enforcement agencies, especially the FBI, appears to have been 
the major driving force behind the 1986 amendments to the FOIA. 132 CONG. REc. Sl4,299 
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy); S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 23 
(1983). See generally Freedom of Information Reform Act, 1983: Hearings on S. 774 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 431-
501 (1984) (prepared statement, testimony, and related exhibits of William H. Webster, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation). Congress was concerned with three general problems that 
Exemption 7 was thought to have created for federal law enforcement agencies in their legitimate 
law enforcement roles: (1) "disclosure of sensitive non-investigative law enforcement materials," 
(2) "premature disclosure of investigative activities," and (3) "the protection of confidential 
sources." S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983). These concerns do not speak to the 
threshold issue. 
103. A strict application of the threshold rule would mandate disclosure even if a specific 
harm would occur. 
104. This potential problem appears to cause significant difficulties in four major areas: Ex-
emptions 7(B) (depriving a person of the right to a fair trial), 7(C) (unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy), 7(D) (disclosing confidential sources), and 7(F) (endangering life or physical 
safety of an individual). See note 4 supra. Under Exemptions 7(B) or 7(C), Congress probably 
did not intend that an innocent third party be deprived of his right to a fair trial or suffer an 
unwarranted invasion of his personal privacy because of improper activities of the FBI over 
which he has no control. And under Exemption 7(F), it seems unlikely Congress intended to 
endanger the "life or physical safety of any individual" because of improper activities of the FBI. 
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"law enforcement purposes." The informer's decision may be based 
on the FBl's ability to keep his identity secret. Thus, some confiden-
tial sources may dry up and the legitimate work of the FBI may be 
impaired. 105 In general, it is unlikely Congress intended that if FBI 
information was not "compiled for law enforcement purposes" then 
complete disclosure must occur even when it would cause harm to the 
FBI itself, third parties, or law enforcement personnel. This is espe-
cially true where the improper activity could be disclosed by deleting 
that information that would lead to the specific harm. Upon reflection 
it seems reasonable that Congress did not intend such harsh results. 
The purpose of the FOIA was to make as much information as possi-
ble available to the public. It was not intended to punish innocent 
third parties or law enforcement personnel because of possible excesses 
of the FBI. 
Although a major advantage of the threshold rule is that it focuses 
the inquiry on the issue of whether the purpose of the FBl's activities 
is lawful or proper, it is unlikely that this focus would in practice sig-
nificantly increase the probability that any illegal or improper activity 
105. There does not appear to be any direct, empirical evidence to support this proposition. 
Critics of the 1974 Exemption 7 have, however, forcefully advanced this as a logical result of 
disclosing informers' identities. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 17,036 (1974) (statement of Sen. 
Hruska), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 340 ("The net result [of Exemption 7] 
will be a crippling effect on the FBl's ability to garner information and obtain successful prosecu-
tion in criminal cases."); 120 CONG. REc. 17,037 (1974) (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted 
in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 343 ("Disclosure of this type of information can only 
hinder the investigative responsibilities of the FBI .... "); see also National Security, Law En-
forcement, and Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act, 38 Bus. LAW. 707, 709-
12 (1983) (edited transcript of ABA panel discussion Aug. 10, 1982; comments of William H. 
Webster, director FBI). 
Numerous examples of the problems the FOIA posed for law enforcement agencies, espe· 
cially the FBI, were presented in congressional testimony during Senate Bill 774 consideration. 
FBI Director Webster was a leading critic of the FOIA in these hearings. See, e.g., Freedom of 
Information Reform Act, 1983: Hearings on S. 774 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-93, 432-44 (1984). Many of the 
examples suggest problems with law enforcement's application of the FOIA rather than with the 
FOIA itself. For example, a convicted loan shark was able to identify a government informant 
"because the suspected informant's name was not completely redacted" from the released docu-
ments. Id. at 67 (example 31, emphasis added). Failure to remove an informant's name should 
not be blamed on the FOIA. In still another example, an FBI informant was identified because 
the FBI released information detailing a meeting to discuss criminal activities attended by only 
three individuals; only the informant's name was removed from the released document. As Di-
rector Webster pointed out, the "name of the missing person also must be the name of the in-
formant." Id. at 440, 452. Director Webster did not indicate why this was not simply a 
misapplication of the 1974 version of Exemption 7(D). Other examples indicate that potential 
informants refuse to assist law enforcement agencies because they fear that information that 
might identify them might "be given out by mistake." See, e.g., id. at 83 (example 136). Other 
law enforcement agencies have expressed similar fears in disclosing certain information to the 
FBI. Id. at 86, 88 (examples 153, 157, and 163). But fear of such mistakes will persist under any 
system allowing some disclosure of information possessed by law enforcement agencies; the only 
"failsafe" solution (which would still be subject to politically motivated leaks, see, e.g. id. at 510 
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The FBI has in the past been able to develop the art of leaking to a 
level of excellence which is the envy of most other agencies .... ")) would be to provide a blanket 
exemption to law enforcement agencies. 
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will be made public. The showing required for "law enforcement pur-
poses" under the threshold rule is minimal under any of the state-
ments of the existing standard. 106 To date there are apparently no 
cases where the FBI was actually forced to disclose significant infor-
mation because of a lack of a proper law enforcement purpose. 107 
Therefore, the practical effect of the threshold rule appears to be the 
same as the per se rule relative to the actual information disclosed. 108 
Moreover, it may be extremely difficult to set out a workable stan-
dard for determining which investigations are for proper law enforce-
ment purposes. It may be particularly difficult to distinguish between 
an investigation that lacks a law enforcement purpose and one that 
simply turns out to be a blind alley. 109 Further, in cases where there 
was clearly no "law enforcement purpose" but disclosure would result 
106. See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text. 
107. Several courts have found that the government had not met the Exemption 7 threshold 
test of "compiled for law enforcement purposes" but allowed the government additional time to 
satisfy the requirement. Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F. Supp. 336, 340 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Silets v. FBI, 
591 F. Supp. 490, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 775-
76 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
108. For example, in Pratt v. Webster the trial court held that the FBI documents, generated 
by the FBl's Counter-Intelligence Program against the Black Panther Party using illegal FBI 
practices, were not the result of"any legitimate law enforcement purpose" and ordered the docu-
ments disclosed. The appellate court reversed, holding that, although illegal methods might have 
been employed, the information was "derived at least in part from a purpose to enforce and 
prevent violations of the criminal laws." 673 F.2d 408, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
In Stern v. FBI the trial court ordered the disclosure of the names of three FBI employees 
investigated in connection with a possible FBI "cover-up" of the FBl's "wide-spread illegal sur-
veillance of political activists through the use of surreptitious entries and wiretappings." 737 
F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The appellate court reversed, holding that the investigation was for 
law enforcement purposes because the investigation focused "directly on specifically alleged ille-
gal acts, illegal acts of particular identified officials, acts which could, if proven, result in civil or 
criminal sanctions." 737 F.2d at 89 (quoting Rural Haus. Alliance v. United States Dept. of 
Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The court further held, under an Exemption 7(C) 
balancing test, that the higher-level employee's name must be disclosed because he had "know-
ingly" participated in the cover-up. 737 F.2d at 93. 
King v. United States Department of Justice held that FBI documents, pertaining to an indi-
vidual "in close association with individuals and organizations that were of investigative interest 
to the FBI" during the "McCarthy era," met the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. 586 F. 
Supp. 286, 293-94 (D.D.C. 1983). The FBI asserted that the information was gathered "pursu-
ant to Title 18, U.S.C. Section 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), ... Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2384 
(Seditious Conspiracy), ... Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2385 (Overthrow of the Government) .... " 
586 F. Supp. at 293. While refusing to comment on "the 'McCarthy era' climate during which 
part of the FBI investigation occurred," the court held that the threshold test had been met 
because there was a "colorable claim" of a federal law violation. 586 F. Supp. at 294. 
Dunaway v. Webster involved a FOIA suit to obtain FBI documents gathered during 1940-
1962 on several singing groups associated with folksinger Pete Seeger. 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 
(N.D. Cal. 1981). After four years oflitigation the court found that the government had failed to 
meet its burden but was unwilling to force disclosure of the documents because the privacy 
interests of those investigated should "not be ridden over roughshod because of the government's 
dilatory tactics." 519 F. Supp. at 1066. The court, however, found a showing of an "internal 
security" investigation was "barely sufficient" to meet Exemption 7 threshold requirement. 519 
F. Supp. at 1075-76. 
109. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1979). A probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion standard would not be appropriate in the threshold rule because a legitimate FBI investiga-
tion may be undertaken to seek evidence sufficient to show probable cause or reasonable 
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in significant harm, there may be a tendency to broaden the interpreta-
tion of "law enforcement purpose" to bring the activity into Exemp-
tion 7 and thus avoid the harm. The threshold rule in actual practice, 
therefore, tends to move closer to the per se rule. 110 
B. The Per Se Rule 
The per se rule treats all "records or information" of the FBI as 
being "compiled for law enforcement purposes." The major advan-
tage of the per se rule is its ease of application. The rule promotes 
judicial efficiency; the court is not required to determine if the record 
was "compiled for law enforcement purposes." If it is true that most 
FBI investigations are in fact for "law enforcement purposes,"111 this 
inquiry into the law enforcement purpose can often be eliminated 
without defeating the goals of the FOIA. 112 If it is determined that 
one of the specific harms might occur (or might reasonably be ex-
pected to occur) by disclosure, then the information may be 
withheld.113 
A disadvantage of the per se rule is that the FBI is more likely, 
without close judicial supervision, to "cover-up" improper activi-
ties.114 Even in cases where the disclosure of the illegal activity is ulti-
mately made, the disclosure may be significantly delayed. 115 This 
problem arises because the per se rule does not focus on the "law en-
forcement purpose" of the investigation. The possibility of such 
suspicion. Furthermore, the legislative histories of the 1966, 1974, and 1986 FOIAs suggest a 
deferential approach to the FBI relative to Exemption 7. See Part I.D supra. 
110. For possible examples, see Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F. Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal. 1986); King v. 
United States Dept. of Justice, 586 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1983); Demetracopoulos v. FBI, 510 F. 
Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1981). 
111. The use of the modified per se rule should allow this assumption to be tested. Further, 
the deterrent effect of the modified per se rule should provide an inducement to the FBI to avoid 
investigations which are not for law enforcement purposes. See also note 28 supra. 
112. For the vast majority of legitimate FBI investigations, the judicial inquiry into the "law 
enforcement purpose" issue would likely be insignificant. Only at the margins, where the "law 
enforcement purpose" could not readily be determined from the record, would significant judicial 
resources be required. But these would be the very cases where some type of FBI oversight is 
most needed and would be most helpful. 
113. s. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra 
note 5, at 158 (Information "may be withheld where the agency makes a specific affirmative 
determination that the public interest and the specific circumstances presented dictate - as well 
as that the intent of the exemption relied on allows - that the information should be withheld.") 
(emphasis in original). See generally J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 20, § 1.10; 2 J. 
O'REILLY, supra note 20, ch. 17; C. MARWICK, supra note 20, at 98-110. 
114. This problem may be alleviated to some extent by increased congressional oversight of 
the intelligence agencies. See generally AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, OVERSIGHT AND AC-
COUNTABILITY OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: AN EVALUATION (1985). 
115. The threshold rule may also have this problem. See Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 
1059, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 1981). However, it may be an even greater problem when the per se rule is 
employed because the focus of the initial inquiry is not on the proper or improper "law enforce-
ment purpose." 
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"cover-ups" is clearly contrary to congressional intent.116 
Both the threshold and the per se rules have significant advantages 
and disadvantages, and neither is clearly superior to the other. A new 
rule, proposed in Part III, attempts to combine the major advantages 
of both the threshold and per se rules in the spirit of the congressional 
intent of animating the FOIA. 
Ill. EXEMPTION 7 PROPOSED RULE: THE 
MODIFIED PER SE RULE 
Courts should adopt the per se rule for the first prong of the Ab-
ramson test117 but with significant changes in its implementation. This 
new rule, termed the "modified per se rule," provides that all "records 
or information" of the FBI are presumed "compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes" when applying Exemption 7. This is equivalent to the 
current per se rule. But when the plaintiff can show118 a "reasonable 
likelihood in view of the circumstances"119 of the investigation being 
for political or other improper purposes (that is, not for "law enforce-
ment purposes") or being carried out by improper means, the court 
must examine the documents in camera 120 in order to assure, if at all 
possible, 121 that the political or improper purpose of the investigation 
or the improper means are disclosed. 122 The standards currently em-
116. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
117. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. 
118. This test clearly places the burden on the plaintiff to show "a reasonable likelihood in 
view of the circumstances" that the investigation was not for legitimate law enforcement pur-
poses. It may be argued that this is inconsistent with the congressional decision to place the 
burden on the agency seeking to prevent disclosure. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
However, placing the burden on the FBI to show that the "record or information" was gathered 
for "law enforcement purposes" would essentially reinstate the threshold rule. Furthermore, the 
burden placed on the plaintiff is not siguificant. Generally the plaintiff need only suggest in some 
creditable manner that the investigation was more likely than not carried out for some reason 
other than a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The plaintiff should then be entitled to have 
the court inspect the records in camera. In most cases, the investigation will clearly be for law 
enforcement purposes; for example, one indicted for bank robbery will not be able to convince a 
court that the FBI investigation was for an improper purpose. 
119. See text following note 128 infra. 
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982). See note 31 supra. 
121. Even under this test it may not be possible to release information concerning the im-
proper purpose of the investigation. The court must still determine if exposing the actual unlaw-
ful purpose of the investigation would "reasonably be expected" to cause one of the specific 
harms listed in Exemption 7. See notes 126-27 infra and accompanying text. 
122. Senator Muskie in Senate Bill 1142 offered an amendment to Exemption 1 of the FOIA 
that would have required in camera inspection of documents the government wished to withhold 
on grounds of national security classifications. This was considered an "excessive response" to 
EPA v. Mink, see note 55 supra, and was rejected. 120 CONG. REc. 17,022 (1974) (statement of 
Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 303. Senator Muskie's amend-
ment would have required in camera inspection for all documents coming under Exemption 1. 
The proposed per se rule only requires in camera inspection when the plaintiff can show a "rea-
sonable likelihood" that the investigation was not for "law enforcement purposes." Therefore, in 
camera inspection will only be required for Exemption 7 cases on an infrequent basis. See notes 
28 & 111 supra and accompanying text. 
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ployed in applying Exemption 7 relative to the six specific criteria or 
harms would remain unchanged under the modified per se rule. 123 
Whereas the per se rule reads the statutory language "compiled for 
law enforcement purposes" out of Exemption 7, 124 the modified per se 
rule proposed here effectively reads the language back into the exemp-
tion during the in camera inspection. 
The primary purpose of the modified per se rule is to increase the 
likelihood of exposing the political or improper investigation or the use 
of improper investigatory means. It is important to note that under this 
modified per se rule the court cannot do anything that it does not 
currently have the power to do under the existing per se rule. In cam-
era inspection is currently available at the court's discretion. 125 The 
modified per se rule only adds the requirement of in camera inspection 
in cases where the plaintiff can show the "reasonable likelihood under 
the circumstances" of the information being compiled for purposes 
other than law enforcement or the investigation being carried out by 
improper means. 
It is also important to note that the modified per se rule does not 
allow disclosure of sensitive information 126 that could not be disclosed 
under the current per se rule because it would cause, or reasonably be 
expected to cause, one of the specified harms. But the modified per se 
rule increases the probability that the improper conduct will actually 
be disclosed. Assume that the FBI had compiled a file on John Doe 
strictly for political reasons and the disclosure of that information 
would cause one or more of the harms specified in Exemption 7. 
Under the current per se rule the information could not be disclosed 
because of the specified harms; the lack of "law enforcement purpose" 
would never be an issue.127 Under the modified per se rule the infor-
mation still could not be disclosed for the same reasons; however, the 
court, upon an appropriate showing by the plaintiff, would inspect the 
documents to determine if the improper nature of the investigation 
could be disclosed without causing any of the specified harms. If dis-
closure of the improper nature of the investigation could be disclosed 
123. See, e.g., J. FRANKLIN & R. BOUCHARD, supra note 20, at §§ 1.10[1)-[6]. 
124. See text following note 21 supra. 
125. See note 31 supra. 
126. The amount of information disclosed will vary in each case. In some cases it may be 
possible to release the actual documents disclosing the improper purpose or method of the inves-
tigation if such disclosure does not result in the specific harms that Exemption 7 attempts to 
avoid. In other cases the court may only be able to indicate the improper purpose or method by 
releasing a conclusory statement giving only minimal details of the actual transgression. But 
such a conclusory statement would be better than simply ignoring the transgression. In still 
other cases even such a conclusory statement could be inappropriate because its mere release 
might result in one of the specific harms noted in Exemption 7. 
127. Under the threshold rule, once it has been determined that the investigation was not for 
a "law enforcement purpose," the information should be disclosed without regard to any harm 
caused by the disclosure. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
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without causing one of the six specified harms, such disclosure would 
be mandated. If, however, disclosure of the improper nature would 
also result in one of the specified harms, the disclosure of the improper 
nature itself must also be forbidden. In the latter case, the final out-
come under the current and the modified per se rule would be identi-
cal. In the former case, however, the outcome might be very different. 
Under the current per se rule, the FBI might be able to hide or "cover-
up" the· improper purpose of the investigation at the same time it was 
allowed to withhold information that would result in one of the six 
specific harms. With increased judicial involvement under the modi-
fied per se rule, such a "cover-up" would be much more difficult. 
Like most reasonableness standards, the proposed "reasonable 
likelihood" standard is not capable of precise definition. 128 The mere 
allegation by the plaintiff that the FBI investigation was not for "law 
enforcement purposes" would generally not be sufficient to satisfy this 
"reasonable likelihood" standard. The "reasonable likelihood" stan-
dard should be satisfied when the plaintiff can show, by either allega-
tions or testimony, that the FBI investigation was more likely than not 
carried out for some reason other than legitimate "law enforcement 
purposes."129 This standard does, however, require a case-by-case 
analysis. Therefore, the necessary showing will depend in large part 
on the particular plaintiff and the surrounding circumstances. Other 
factors, such as the timing and type of investigation, may play a signif-
icant role in particular cases. Nor should the plaintiff be required to 
show that the improper purpose was the only purpose of the investiga-
tion. The plaintiff's burden should only be to demonstrate with a 
"reasonable likelihood" that an improper purpose exjsted. Once the 
plaintiff makes such a showing, the court must subject the documents 
to in camera inspection. If in camera inspection confirms that the in-
vestigation was improper, such information should be disclosed if at 
all possible. 130 
The modified per se rule can, perhaps, be illustrated best by an 
example. In Demetracopoulos v. FB/ 131 the plaintiff asserted that his 
FBI investigation "was 'bogus from the beginning,' and [was] designed 
solely to discredit him as an opponent of State Department policy to-
ward Greece."132 The plaintiff further claimed that the FBI con-
ducted its investigation for political purposes in order "to 'get' 
something on an embarrassing opponent of the State Department pol-
128. See generally w. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984). 
129. See note 118 supra. 
130. See note 126 supra. 
131. 510 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1981). 
132. 510 F. Supp. at 530. 
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icy favoring the Greek dictatorship."133 The FBI asserted that the 
investigation was strictly for law enforcement purposes including pos-
sible violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 134 and possible 
deportation. 135 The court found that the plaintiff's allegations were 
"not frivolous on their face" and, over the FBl's strong objections, 
ordered the documents inspected in camera.136 After examination of 
the documents and applying the threshold test, the court found "the 
investigation was not a mere sham designed to intimidate or embarrass 
him in his role of critic of Greek or American policy." The court 
further found that a "reasonably prudent government official" could 
have found a sufficient law enforcement purpose.137 The court then 
examined the documents in view of the six specific harms of Exemp-
tion 7 and concluded that the majority of the information in dispute 
could be withheld.138 
Demetracopoulos is an example where, under the modified per se 
rule, the court would be required to conduct an in camera inspection. 
The plaintiff was able to show139 that his opposition to State Depart-
ment policy towards Greece was, with "reasonable likelihood," the ba-
sis for the FBI investigation. Only by an in camera inspection could 
this allegation be tested if the FBI wished to "cover-up" any improper 
purpose. Although the actual information disclosed in Demetraco-
poulos under the court's threshold rule and the modified per se rule 
would likely be very similar in this particular case, 140 the thrust of the 
court's opinion might be very different. Under the threshold rule, the 
court, if it wished to protect sensitive information under Exemption 7, 
must find some legitimate law enforcement purpose. 141 Under the 
modified per se rule, such a "strained" finding142 is not required. The 
specific harm test of Exemption 7 would be applied in the normal 
manner143 regardless of the purpose of the investigation. But the 
court, if it found that the FBI was attempting to silence a government 
133. 510 F. Supp. at 531. 
134. 22 u.s.c. §§ 611-621 (1982). 
135. 510 F. Supp. at 531. The immigration status of the plaintiff is not clear from the 
opinion. 
136. 510 F. Supp. at 530. 
137. 510 F. Supp. at 531. 
138. 510 F. Supp. at 532-34. 
139. See text at note 136 supra. 
140. The information disclosed under the court's threshold rule and the modified per se rule 
presented here would likely be the same because the court in Demetracopoulos employed in cam-
era inspection of the documents, using its discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982). 
141. See text at note 110 supra. 
142. In Demetracopoulos the court may have relied on just such a "strained" finding in order 
to invoke Exemption 7. The court found that "the investigation of plaintiff by the FBI was not a 
mere sham designed to intimidate or embarrass him in his role of critic of Greek or American 
policy." 510 F. Supp. at 531 (emphasis added). 
143. See note 123 supra. 
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critic, could have exposed the improper purpose of the investigation 
without disclosing sensitive information. Exposure of such improper 
activities could have a strong deterrent effect. 144 Further, such find-
ings could help Congress carry out its oversight responsibility. 145 
There are many and varied reasons for adoption of the modified 
per se rule; some are illustrated in the above example. In most cases 
the judicial efficiency of the original per se rule will be retained be-
cause "most" FBI investigations are for "law enforcement purposes." 
And like the threshold rule, the focus of the inquiry will be on the 
potentially improper purpose of the investigation. The new rule also 
avoids the possibility, present in the threshold rule, that complete dis-
closure of FBI investigations not for "law enforcement purposes" will 
be required regardless of the injury to innocent third parties, law en-
forcement personnel, or to the ability of the FBI to carry out its legiti-
mate function. 146 Also, courts will not be tempted to strain to find a 
proper "law enforcement purpose" to avoid disclosing "harmful" in-
formation as they might under the current threshold rule. 147 
The modified per se rule, with its required in camera inspection in 
certain cases, may actually assure more disclosure than the threshold 
rule because it will be more difficult for the FBI to "cover-up" its im-
proper activities due to the increased judicial inspection of documents 
in cases where the possibility of a "cover-up" is most likely.148 
The modified per se rule appears to be consistent with the legisla-
tive intent of the FOIA. In applying Exemption 7 to FBI investiga-
tions, the modified per se rule helps assure full disclosure except for 
information causing the six specified criteria or harms. It helps assure 
that improper FBI activities will be disclosed. And the modified per se 
rule respects and protects legitimate FBI activities; the FBI's ability to 
carry out its legitimate mandate is not impaired. 
This proposed rule also has several additional advantages that 
neither of the current rules possess. Under the modified per se rule, 
the difference between an "improper purpose" and an "improper 
method"149 loses its significance. The modified per se rule is triggered 
by a showing of "reasonable likelihood under the circumstances" of 
either an improper purpose or the use of an improper method. The 
modified per se rule can also be applied to related issues. For example, 
where an investigation is started for legitimate law enforcement pur-
poses but is later continued for improper purposes, the modified per se 
144. See notes 93-94 supra. 
145. See note 114 supra. 
146. See notes 104-05 supra and accompanying text. 
147. See notes 110 & 142 supra and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., Stem v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (possible "cover-up" of illegal FBI 
surveillance activities). 
149. See note 78 supra and accompanying text. 
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rule could be employed to help assure that the improper nature of the 
continued investigation was disclosed. 150 
The primary disadvantage of the modified per se rule is that the in 
camera procedure will require more judicial resources. But in camera 
inspection will only be required in a limited number of cases where the 
plaintiff can make a showing of "reasonable likelihood under the cir-
cumstances" of an improper purpose for the investigation. 151 When 
there are large numbers of documents, a random sampling of docu-
ments could be examined. 152 Futhermore, Congress, by specifically al-
lowing in camera inspection for all nine FOIA exemptions, doubtless 
intended that such inspection be employed where appropriate to avoid 
improper withholding of information.153 In Weisberg v. United States 
Department of Justice, 154 Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit stated: "[T]he purpose of the [Freedom of Informa-
tion] Act should not be defeated if there is available a judicial 
technique for advancing it and at the same time ensuring that no harm 
comes to the interests Congress intended to protect. In camera inspec-
tion ... is such a technique."155 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the threshold rule nor the per se rule, as applied to the first 
prong of the Abramson test, is clearly superior based on the legislative 
history of the FOIA or the practical effects of the two rules. 
Courts should adopt a modified per se rule in applying Exemption 
7 to information gathered by the FBI. Like the current per se rule, the 
proposed modified per se rule provides that all "records or informa-
tion" of the FBI are presumed "compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses" when applying Exemption 7. But when the plaintiff can show a 
"reasonable likelihood in view of the circumstances" that the investi-
gation was for political or other improper purposes or that the investi-
150. This issue was raised by the facts in Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F. Supp. 336, 343-44 (C.D. 
Cal. 1986), but was not addressed by the court. 
151. See notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text. 
152. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1972) ("A representative document of those 
sought may be selected for in camera inspection."); Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 945, 948, 
958 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (In what was "perhaps the most extensive FOIA request ever made," the 
FBI was required to submit every one-hundredth page, out of more than 20,000 pages requested, 
for the court's in camera inspection.); Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 
1490 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[S]ampling procedure is appropriately employed, where as here the 
number of documents is excessive and it would not realistically be possible to review each and 
every one."). 
153. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text. 
154. 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) (held that 
FBI files concerning the assassination of President Kennedy were compiled for law enforcement 
purposes and, therefore, were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7). This case was specifi-
cally overruled by the 1974 amendment to Exemption 7. See note 38 supra. 
155. 489 F.2d at 1206 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). 
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gation was carried out by improper means, the court must examine the 
documents in camera to assure that the political or improper purpose 
or means is disclosed. The modified per se rule will help assure that 
the FBI cannot "pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which 
can be revealed without injury to the public interest."156 
-Richard A. Kaba 
156. See note 3 supra. 
